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Abstract
AU : Pleaseconfirmthatallheadinglevelsarerepresentedcorrectly:More than 1.6 million Sev re Acute Respiratory Synd ome Coronavirus 2 (SAU : PleasenotethatSARS   CoV   2hasbeendefinedasSevereAcuteRespiratorySyndromeCoronavirus2insentencesMorethan1:6million:::andAsweawaitwidespreadaccessto::::Pleasecheckandcorrectifnecessary:RS-CoV-2)
tests were administered daily in the United States at the peak of the epidemic, with a signifi-
cant focus on individual treatment. Here, we show that objective-driven, strategic sampling
designs and analyses can maximize information gain at the population level, which is neces-
sary to increase situational awareness and predict, prepare for, and respond to a pandemic,
while also continuing to inform individual treatment. By focusing on specific objectives such
as individual treatment or disease prediction and control (e.g., via the collection of popula-
tion-level statistics to inform lockdown measures or vaccine rollout) and drawing from the lit-
erature on capture–recapture methods to deal with nonrandom sampling and testing errors,
we illustrate how public health objectives can be achieved even with limited test availability
when testing programs are designed a priori to meet those objectives.
Introduction
“Did you lose the keys here? No, but the light is much better here.” (Streetlight metaphor, vari-
ous attributions)
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As we await widespread access to vaccines globally and manage delays in vaccine rollout
(e.g., [1,2]), testing—used in conjunction with contact tracing and isolation—is a critical tool
for controlling the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-
2) [3], understanding the dynamics of more contagious variants [4], and planning for future
outbreaks [5]. While testing for the virus is key to limiting transmission by enabling the early
detection and control of local outbreaks and informing vaccination strategies by providing the
parameter estimates needed for epidemiological modeling (“population-level” objectives),
tests are still primarily used for individual treatment (“individual-level” objectives). Interna-
tionally, there are some examples of testing efforts to inform population-level objectives (e.g.,
[6]). Despite widespread agreement on the need for more, and more coordinated, testing [7,8],
such efforts at the national scale appear to be lacking in the US, especially testing to inform
population-level objectives critical to pandemic vaccine rollout. With a limited, albeit growing,
number of tests, we must carefully consider who, when, where, and how often to test for virus
presence and how to interpret results to inform differing public health objectives (Table 1)
[9,10]. In this paper, we argue that current testing approaches could be further strengthened
with the strategic allocation of relatively few additional tests and symptom-based surveys. We
also argue that this approach is critical to the development of targeted disease monitoring for
national programs such as the proposed National Center for Epidemic Forecasting and Out-
break Analytics [5]. We focus on testing within the US public health system in particular but
expect the proposed approach to apply more broadly.
Objective-driven sampling
We use the “streetlight effect” metaphor (of searching where convenient) to suggest potential
problems with our use of collected statistics on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (CAU : PleasenotethatCOVID   19hasbeendefinedasCoronavirusDisease2019inthesentenceWeusethestreetlighteffectmetaphor::::Pleasecheckandcorrectifnecessary:OVID-19) cases
for all of the various decisions requiring data. These kinds of problems extend beyond the
Table 1. Examples of objective-driven sampling strategies and their utility for individual-level versus population-level inferences.
Objective Test utility Sampling design
Individual level
Therapeutic Determine infection status and appropriate medical treatment for a
symptomatic individual
Test symptomatic individuals who self-report or individuals in
high-risk categories
Contact tracing Trigger the process of identifying persons with whom a known infected
individual has been in recent contact to test and/or quarantine contacts who
may have been infected and limit spread
Test (typically) symptomatic individuals, with subsequent tests
allocated to individuals with whom the focal individuals have had
contact
Prophylactic Determine infection status to inform entry permission (e.g., to a workplace,
airline flight, school, or event space) and decrease risk of transmission to others
in the specified group or location; determine precautions for healthcare
professionals (e.g., PPE)
Test all individuals associated with the focal location or group and
repeat periodically (e.g., for workplaces, schools, or recurring
events)
Population level
Epidemiological Estimate key epidemiological parameters (e.g., prevalence, mortality ratea, and
infection ratea) to investigate disease dynamics and parameterize projection
models
Select a random or representative subset from the population to




Determine effective vaccine distribution within and between populations,
assess risk for hospital planning and resource allocation (e.g., beds, ventilators,
and PPE), or evaluate the effectiveness of a public health policy aimed at
reducing transmission (e.g., mask wearing, distancing, nonessential business
closures, etc.) based on context-dependent epidemiological parameters (e.g.,
prevalence, mortality ratea, and infection ratea)
Select a random or representative subset from the population to
test (or nonrepresentative subsets and estimate sampling
probabilities)
aInference requires follow-up testing of sampled individuals.
PAU : AnabbreviationlisthasbeencompiledforthoseusedthroughoutTable1:Pleaseverifythatallentriesarecorrect:PE, personal protect ve equipment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001307.t001
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current pandemic to a variety of disciplines and issues for which omnibus monitoring pro-
grams are used to meet all potential monitoring needs. We advocate an alternative approach
that focuses sample design and parameter estimation (including error correction) on meeting
specific objectives (see Fig 1). The proposed approach does not preclude the use of such tar-
geted data for secondary objectives, when appropriate, but instead seeks to ensure that at least
the primary objective(s) can be met. Further, this approach does not necessarily require the
collection of more data, but the targeted, more efficient collection of data for specified objec-
tives. The importance of tailoring sampling strategies to the question or parameter of interest
Fig 1. Objective-driven testing framework. Testing strategy design, “sampling strategy,” is part of a multistep
framework, including error correction and analysis to inform individual- or population-level public health objectives.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001307.g001
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has been demonstrated previously (e.g., for ecological monitoring as in [11–13], for human
disease prevalence as in [14], and for optimal livestock disease control as in [15]). Given that
testing for SARS-CoV-2 lacks clear guidelines, we believe there is a need for increased focus on
designing test allocation strategies based on the individual-level and population-level objective
(s) they are meant to inform (Table 1).
Location-specific numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths, and inferred quantities such as
test positivity rates and death rates, are reported daily. Such reports dominate websites and
newsfeeds and are often interpreted as providing comparable information about the pandem-
ic’s trajectory across locations. However, the interpretation and utility of these numbers
depend on how individuals are selected for testing and on test result accuracy [9]. For example,
comparison of positivity rates or numbers of confirmed cases at 2 locations that use different
testing strategies (e.g., testing symptomatic individuals only versus symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic individuals) would likely yield differences that reflect a complicated confounding of
true differences in COVID-19 prevalence and artifactual differences due to testing strategy
(“Numerical example of misleading testing statistics” in S1 Text) and classification errors
(“Conditional probabilities of infection” and “Dealing with errors in population-level infer-
ence” in S1 Text). To meet a public health objective requiring such comparisons, we need
inference methods that properly account for differences in testing strategy and classification
errors.
We propose a strategic framework for thinking about testing in which (1) different objec-
tives of testing are clearly articulated; and (2) sampling design and subsequent data analysis are
tailored a priori to achieve these objectives, while accounting for sampling constraints and
measurement errors (Fig 1). Our focus is on the use of strategic testing for targeted disease
monitoring, in which sampling is designed to provide information used to make treatment or
control decisions. We contrast this approach with ad hoc testing, which provides a form of
convenience sampling. We illustrate how statistical methods developed primarily in wildlife
ecology can be applied to sample design and parameter estimation to meet specified objectives
for the current pandemic.
We first discuss a few representative testing objectives relevant to the monitoring of
COVID-19 in the pandemic phase. We categorize these objectives as individual- and popula-
tion-level inferences based on the decisions that test results are intended to inform (Table 1,
Fig 1). We focus on the relationship between stated objectives, how individuals are selected for
testing (“sampling”), and how errors are handled.
Inferences about individual parameters
Individual-level inferences entail efforts to assess whether a specific individual is infected with
a pathogen (Table 1). Such inferences inform decisions made about the tested individual (e.g.,
treatment, isolation, etc.). A key concern for these inferences is acting on incorrect results
given imperfect diagnostic tests. To account for imperfect tests, decisions can be based on not
just the test result (infected or not), but also on conditional probabilities of the result being
true or false. Conditional probabilities of test result accuracy (positive or negative predictive
values of a test) depend not only on test sensitivity (true positive rate) and specificity (true neg-
ative rate), but also on the population-level parameter, prevalence [16,17] (Fig 1 in [18]; “Con-
ditional probabilities of infection” in S1 Text), estimates of which depend on sampling strategy
and inference method. If readily measured individual covariates such as symptoms are associ-
ated with the probability that an individual is infected, then we model that infection probabil-
ity as a function of the covariates (see next section) and use it in place of an overall prevalence
parameter in the expressions of “Conditional probabilities of infection” in S1 Text.
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Conditional probabilities of infection, given either a positive or negative test result, are use-
ful when considering the reasons for seeking individual-level inferences: treatment of the focal
individual, quarantine and isolation decisions, safety of attending healthcare workers, or iden-
tifying prior contacts of the focal individual. If the computed probabilities admit more uncer-
tainty than desired, then error probabilities often can be reduced with additional information
provided by replicating tests on the individual (“Conditional probabilities of infection” in
S1 Text).
Inferences about population parameters
The focus of population-level inference is not on individual test results, but rather on how test
results can inform parameter estimates that characterize the entire population (e.g., preva-
lence, infection rate by age or other characteristics, reproduction number, or disease-specific
mortality rate). These estimates are needed to inform epidemiological models and evaluate
population-level decisions (e.g., to determine vaccine distribution strategies). Sampling entails
the selection of subsets of individuals for testing, and different sampling designs are required
for inferences about different population-level parameters such as prevalence (“Inferences
about population parameters” in S1 Text).
Prevalence is often defined as the proportion of individuals in a population infected at a
given point in time. The only COVID-19 surveillance data available in many countries at pres-
ent are based on sampling of symptomatic individuals. However, inferences about prevalence
and other population-level parameters are not readily extracted from such data [19,20].
When testing resources are limited, prevalence is best estimated by selecting a random or
representative (defined with respect to factors influencing the likelihood that an individual is
infected) sample of individuals for testing. The fraction of individuals testing positive provides
an estimate of prevalence (see “Inferences about population parameters” in S1 Text). But sam-
pling individuals in a random or representative manner is not typical of many standard sur-
veillance programs, and, sometimes, may not be possible at large scales. For example, much of
the current information about numbers of COVID-19 cases comes from sampling programs
in which symptomatic individuals are tested with much higher probability than asymptomatic
individuals.
An alternative approach is to select small groups of individuals in a nonrepresentative way
and to estimate the probabilities that a randomly sampled individual would appear in these
groups (e.g., using symptom-based surveys). These sampling probabilities can be incorporated
directly into inference models, permitting approximately unbiased inference despite nonrepre-
sentative sampling (Fig 2C and 2D) and can be achieved through coordination of existing tar-
geted sampling efforts or the addition of a few, targeted sampling efforts. This approach (see
“Inferences about population parameters” in S1 Text) can be viewed as a variant of “capture–
recapture” modeling (“Capture–recapture inference” in S1 Text) and has a limited history of
use in epidemiology.
As an example, consider the estimation of prevalence. The primary data source for
COVID-19 in many locations is testing of self-reported symptomatic individuals. These data
permit direct estimation of the probability that a symptomatic individual is infected. However,
tests of asymptomatic individuals will typically be too few and nonrepresentative for useful
inference. A targeted random sample can be conducted to estimate the proportion of individu-
als in the focal population that belongs to each of these 2 groups, symptomatic and asymptom-
atic individuals. Note that this step requires no additional testing, only a survey of externally
detectable symptoms (e.g., temperature readings). The individuals presenting as asymptomatic
(or a random subset of them) in this sample can then be tested to estimate infection probability
PLOS BIOLOGY
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Fig 2. The importance of objective-driven sampling strategy design. The “iceberg” problem is illustrated for 2 different sampling strategies: testing for an objective of
inference about whether or not an individual is infected to inform treatment or initiate contact tracing, etc., (sampling strategy I) and testing for an objective of
inference about population parameters such as prevalence to inform decision-making about a population-level intervention (sampling strategy II). In both strategies,
individuals above the blue “water” line are tested, and those below go untested. We attempt to estimate the prevalence or proportion of individuals infected as the
proportion infected for our sample. The total number of infected individuals in both icebergs is the same; however, the proportion infected differs substantially between
samples based on the 2 strategies. We illustrate 2 assumptions about test accuracy with the following 4 figure panels: (A) Sampling given perfect tests (i.e., the probability
of a true positive, p11, is 1, and the probability of a false positive, p10, is 0) and (B) sampling given imperfect tests. (C) We illustrate a third sampling strategy (strategy II
with capture–recapture and stratified sampling) and compare it to sampling strategy I (symptomatic individuals only) and II (symptomatic individuals + random
sample of asymptomatic individuals). Capture–recapture methods permit approximately unbiased inference in the face of false-negative and positive errors and are
combined with stratified sampling to deal with nonrandom sampling. Finally, in (D), we compare the observed proportion infected in the samples based on all 3
strategies to the actual infected proportion of the population (under both scenarios of perfect testing (as in A) and imperfect testing (as in B)). The application of
capture–recapture methods and stratification to strategy II (purple bars) provides the most accurate estimate of the true population prevalence (black bars).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001307.g002
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for this group. Estimates of these 3 parameters can be used to estimate prevalence as a derived
parameter, or all 3 data sets can be combined within a joint likelihood to estimate the preva-
lence parameter directly (“Inferences about population parameters” in S1 Text).
Even after dealing with nonrepresentative sampling, counts of individual test results are still
influenced by the diagnostic uncertainties of false-positive and negative results. The kind of
thinking that underlies the conditional probabilities of infection for individual tests can be
incorporated into models for estimating population-level parameters. Replicate testing can be
used to deal with diagnostic errors in 2 approaches developed for studying animal populations:
occupancy modeling [17] and multi-event capture–recapture modeling [21]. These approaches
permit estimation of prevalence, for example, in the face of classification errors. If assessment
of symptoms or quantitative measurements of infection status [22] are obtained, they can be
incorporated into the modeling as covariates. Elaborations of these modeling frameworks per-
mit error rate parameters to vary temporally or across individuals (see “Dealing with errors in
population-level inference” in S1 Text). The occupancy and capture–recapture approaches
treat both error rates and focal population parameters as unknown parameters in a single joint
likelihood, properly incorporating the various sources of uncertainty in estimates of focal
parameters and their variances. Variance estimates of focal parameters are important to deci-
sion-making and can be incorporated directly into formal optimization methods designed to
deal with such uncertainty.
Prevalence is one parameter of interest, but a central point of this commentary is that sample
designs and analysis methods must be tailored to a specified set of focal parameters. Inferences
about other key population parameters, such as mortality and infection rates, require repeat
testing of the same individuals over time (e.g., as currently done in vaccine trials). Periodic test-
ing is used to assess death or recovery of initially infected individuals and death and infection
state for individuals not initially infected. Multi-event capture–recapture models [21] can be
used with data on individuals obtained at multiple assessment points, t, t+1, etc. (e.g., weekly
and monthly). At each assessment point, each individual still living from the original sample is
tested, and the observed state (e.g., uninfected and infected or susceptible, infected, and recov-
ered) is recorded. The state space can be expanded to include other characteristics of individuals
that are relevant to sampling (e.g., symptomatic infected, symptomatic uninfected, asymptom-
atic infected, and asymptomatic uninfected). The multi-event capture–recapture framework
admits state misclassification and provides estimates of the probability of an individual being in
a specific state, as well as the state-specific probabilities of death during each interval (e.g., t to t
+1) and making state transitions (e.g., becoming infected or moving to the recovered state).
In the event that all individuals from the initial sample cannot be located to be tested at
each assessment point, the modeling approach includes state-specific detection probabilities,
recognizing that (1) on some occasions, disease state cannot be assessed for every individual;
and (2) state misclassification may occur for individuals that are tested. Detection history data
consist of information for each potential assessment or testing period on whether the individ-
ual was tested or not, and, if so, what the test outcome was (to what observation state was the
individual assigned for that sample period). The data are then modeled as a function of param-
eters that include detection probabilities, survival probabilities, state transition probabilities,
and state classification probabilities. If the initial sample of individuals to be followed is not
random or representative, then parameter estimates corresponding to the entire population
can be obtained as a weighted sum of estimated probabilities as in expression F in S1 Text. The
need to track individuals over time necessitates consideration of patient data protection, as for
other COVID-19 processes such as contact tracing. Sampling design and corresponding ana-
lytic methods again depend on the objectives of the testing program, which include the focal
parameter(s) required to meet population-level objectives.
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Conclusions
Testing thus informs both individual- and population-level control decisions, but different
objectives necessitate different sampling strategies—from administering tests to symptomatic
individuals appearing at healthcare facilities to preemptively testing and surveying individuals
according to a priori designs without regard to presence of symptoms or appearance in the
healthcare system. Limited resources require decisions about allocation of tests to inform indi-
vidual treatment and also public health decision-making. The keys to successful testing strat-
egies are (1) to clearly specify the objectives of the testing efforts; and (2) to tailor
sampling and analytic approaches to those objectives. Importantly, data produced by testing
for one objective may not be useful for other objectives without specific supporting data and
associated analytic approaches. Currently, individual-level objectives are prioritized, and test-
ing data are later repurposed to estimate epidemiological parameters and inform public health
objectives. In order to accurately estimate population-level parameters, we need to supplement
existing testing efforts with small, but coordinated sampling efforts designed with population-
level objectives in mind. Data from relatively few tests, when allocated in a coordinated and
efficient manner and combined with tailored inference methods, can carry a high value of
information, with direct applicability not only to epidemiological model parameterization, but
also to decision-making about the pandemic. Clear thinking about test allocation to popula-
tion-level objectives will be especially important for epidemiological modeling and control of
new variants of COVID-19 and for making decisions about vaccine allocation and efficacy
globally. Certainly, we are not claiming that such clear thinking does not exist in specific pro-
grams and studies being carried out in the US, but rather that we need more of it, especially at
a coordinated national level.
Allocation of tests to specific monitoring objectives can be based on current assessments of
the relative value of information to the different decisions that the data are intended to inform
and the relative importance of these decisions to overall COVID-19 control for individuals
and populations. Sampling designs and analyses of resulting data can then be tailored to each
objective. Although COVID-19 has brought this issue into stark relief, lack of resources and
support for targeted disease monitoring and evaluation programs has been a limitation to the
assessment and design of vaccine programs the world over. In much the same way that we
should shine new light where we expect our missing keys and not just search where there is
available light, we could strengthen current testing approaches in order to better support con-
tainment during pandemic vaccine rollout with the strategic allocation of relatively few addi-
tional tests and symptom-based surveys.
Supporting information
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